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Abstract
We develop a two-country general equilibrium model of foreign assistance tied to environmental
clean-up in the presence of transboundary pollution. The recipient country generates pollution as a
by-product in the production of a ‘dirty’ good, which it consumes as well as exports to the donor
country. In contrast to the literature which typically treats aid as a monetary transfer, we assume
that foreign aid consists in a transfer of environmental technology that lowers the cost of public
clean-up in the recipient country. We highlight the fact that the marginal propensities to consume
the polluting good in the donor and recipient countries are driving the terms of trade eﬀect at work
in our model. The environmental and welfare outcomes are inﬂuenced by the direct, terms of trade
and abatement eﬀects of the transfer. We show that such tied aid may be Pareto improving if the
clean-up eﬀect of the foreign aid is strong enough to compensate for the donor’s monetary and terms
of trade losses. We ﬁnally analyze the eﬀects of the green transfer combined with an appropriate
border tax adjustment. Contrary to intuition, we ﬁnd that green technology transfers and border
tax adjustments are not complements.
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From transboundary local pollutants to global pollutants, a large host of environmental
problems have international repercussions. At the same time, there exist signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the stringency of environmental policies adopted by countries with diﬀerent degrees
of development around the world, as documented in the ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ liter-
ature. This creates obvious diﬃculties when it comes to issues requiring international policy
coordination. While potential pollution haven or carbon leakage eﬀects arising from diverg-
ing environmental standards could be mitigated by increasing the abatement capacity of the
global South, developing countries can hardly aﬀord to cover the full cost of addressing these
environmental problems. In such a context, and especially if the pollutant is transboundary
or global, green foreign assistance in various forms may be optimal.
This paper looks at the environmental and welfare impact of a particular type of tied green
aid and border tax adjustments in the case of transboundary pollution. The recipient country
is the net exporter of a dirty good and ﬁnances its (potentially incomplete) public abatement
of pollution via environmental taxes, while the donor country internalizes its own pollution
in an eﬃcient manner. A fraction of the unabated pollution from the recipient aﬀects the
donor, creating a cross-jurisdictional linkage between the two economies and a motive for the
latter to provide the former with ‘green assistance.’ The paper analyzes the eﬀectiveness of
a transfer of green technology between the donor and the recipient and presents conditions
under which the transfer increases abatement, decreases pollution and raises welfare in the
two countries. The results depend on the interplay between the direct, terms of trade and
clean-up eﬀects of the transfer and are a function of the cost of the donation, as well as
the eﬀectiveness of the donated green technology vis-` a-vis the environmental beneﬁts. The
conditions for a ‘normal’ transfer outcome in which the donor loses and the recipient gains,
a transfer paradox in which the donor gains and the recipient loses, and a Pareto improving
outcome in which both countries gain in welfare terms are also discussed.
The welfare eﬀects of various forms of foreign assistance have been studied extensively.
1Foreign aid can be unconditional or conditional (tied), and the existing literature diﬀerenti-
ates between several diﬀerent types of the latter form of assistance. Procurement tying - aid
conditional on government purchases - is analyzed for instance in Kemp and Kojima (1985),
Schweinberger (1990) and Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995). Policy tying - aid conditional
on the implementation of certain policies - is assumed in Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997).
Project tying - aid destined to ﬁnance certain projects - is considered in Schweinberger and
Woodland (2008) and Chao and Yu (1999). This paper assumes a speciﬁc form of project ty-
ing of international assistance by modelling a green technology transfer which lowers the unit
costs of abatement in the recipient. This form of environmental aid addresses the moral hazard
issue associated with cash transfers, while also circumventing the fungibility of aid problem.
Moreover, such technical environmental assistance is the actual form taken by many projects
around the world. Figure 1 below1 is based on OECD data on oﬃcial development assistance
to over 180 diﬀerent recipient countries and regions worldwide and destined for general envi-
ronmental protection. It shows that technical assistance is an important component of this
type of aid. Moreover, besides the so-called ‘free-standing’ technical assistance projects, which
for instance in 2006 were the single largest category of green aid, most projects classiﬁed in
the other categories include a technical assistance component.
Concrete examples of such projects are particularly numerous in Germany, which generally
considers the transfer of technical know-how as a key component of its bilateral development
assistance activities. One of the more prominent such ventures is the Proﬁtable Environmental
Management Project (PREMA), which has assisted many small and medium-sized compa-
nies in developing countries in their eﬀorts to improve their environmental performance. The
federally owned German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has also provided
technical environmental assistance to many developing countries to facilitate the implemen-
tation of Rio commitments, the convention on biological diversity (CBD), the convention to
1 From OECD’s International Development Statistics, Development Assistance Committee (DAC). See
















Figure 1: Types of Foreign Aid for General Environmental Protection (mil. USD, OECD)
combat desertiﬁcation (CCD), the Montreal protocol, etc.2 Technology transfer and assis-
tance to developing countries are also among the areas where there was progress at the 2010
Cancun Climate Conference.3
To preview the main results of the paper, a green technology transfer is eﬀective at in-
creasing the amount of public pollution abatement in the recipient country and leads to
better overall environmental outcomes when the clean-up eﬀect of the transfer dominates any
positive price eﬀect. Strong environmental beneﬁts lead to a Pareto-improving outcome of
the transfer, even when - unlike in the received literature - the two countries have diﬀerent
marginal propensities to consume the dirty good and even when the recipient is the exporter
of this good. When a border tax adjustment is however used in conjunction with an eﬀective
technical assistance, there may be less public abatement of pollution in the recipient and
both the environmental and the welfare outcomes worsen for both countries. Moreover, the
‘normal’ transfer eﬀect of donor immiserization and recipient enrichment is more likely to be
obtained. The next section provides background information and reviews the existing liter-
2 See http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/germany/eco.htm, accessed August 11, 2010.
Also see Schweinberger and Woodland (2008), p. 310 for some additional examples.
3 See ‘A Surprising Success’, The Economist, December 11, 2010.
3ature on the eﬀectiveness of foreign assistance and border tax adjustments in dealing with
pollution abatement.
2. Background and literature review
It is widely accepted that carrot and/or stick-type policy instruments are required in
order to correct many inter-jurisdictional environmental externalities. From the ﬁrst Earth
Summit held in Stockholm in 1972 to Rio in 1992, Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancun in 2010,
international negotiations on environment issues have consistently emphasized the crucial
role of green foreign aid. Articles 2 and 12 of the Stockholm Declaration, for example, urge
developed countries to increase international technical and ﬁnancial assistance available for
environmental protection in developing countries (Roberts et al., 2009). In order to implement
chapter 33 of Agenda 21, the sustainable development plan crafted in preparation for the
Rio summit, developed countries pledged $141.9 billion to help their developing counterparts
tackle global as well as local environmental issues (UNCED, 1992). At the Copenhagen climate
summit in December 2009, participants also agreed to establish the ‘Copenhagen green climate
fund’ to support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing countries
related to climate change mitigation (UNFCC, 2009). The $100 billion fund was conﬁrmed
at the recently concluded global climate talks in Cancun in December 2010. In addition to
this long-term ﬁnance, other projects such as Reduced Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD+) are to be based in developing countries and ﬁnanced by the developed countries.
Indeed, the sustained growth in the total amount of green aid disbursed annually has been
accelerating in recent years, as illustrated by the cumulative trend depicted in Figure 1 above.
At the same time, Border Tax Adjustments are envisaged in both the EU Emissions Trading
System (ETS) and the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Bill (Waxman-Markey),
as punitive instruments meant to ensure a ‘level playing ﬁeld’. Given these trends, it is
important to gain a better understanding of the eﬀects of technology transfers to developing
countries.
4The received literature on foreign environmental aid builds on and introduces foreign aid
into the trade and environment literature that studies the interaction between trade and pol-
lution policies.4 In particular, Chao and Yu (1999) use a parsimonious framework to establish
that aid tied to environmental clean-up can be welfare improving for both countries, when
the beneﬁcial environmental eﬀect exceeds the terms of trade deterioration for the dirty-good
importing recipient, and when the terms of trade improvement exceeds the direct negative
eﬀect of the transfer for the donor. Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri and Michael (2002) describe a
non-cooperative game in which the recipient of untied aid chooses the fraction it allocates to
abatement as well as its pollution tax, while the donor chooses the level of aid. They show
that higher perceived transboundary pollution may lead to better environmental outcomes
via increased transfers. Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri and Michael (2008) analyze a pollution policy
game without foreign aid, in which the degree of cross-border pollution aﬀects the strategic
policy response of the two countries, as well as the pollution and welfare outcomes. In another
recent paper, Schweinberger and Woodland (2008) develop a framework in which foreign aid
tied to public abatement may lead to a crowding out of private abatement and a subsequent
worsening of pollution both in the short and the long run.
This paper resembles Chao and Yu (1999) from a modelling standpoint, as it looks at the
environmental and welfare eﬀects of tied aid aimed at increasing pollution abatement in the
recipient country. Also, like Chao and Yu (1999), Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri and Michael (2002)
and Schweinberger and Woodland (2008) it considers both private and public abatement of
pollution.5 Unlike these papers and given the stylized facts on the trend of foreign environ-
mental assistance already presented, we model the transfer as technological assistance. In a
4 Seminal papers on the interaction between trade and pollution policies include Copeland (1991) and
Copeland and Taylor (1995). For a book-length treatment, also see Copeland and Taylor (2003).
5 Both types of abatement are important. According to the OECD, total pollution abatement and control
expenditures ranges between 1 and 3 % of the GDP in OECD member countries, and the ratio of public to
private expenditures varies greatly by country and pollutant type. The most recent report is for 2002 and
can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/57/4704311.pdf.
5framework similar to Chao and Yu (1999), Haibara (2002) also studies the welfare impact of
international technical assistance, which he assumes to be directed towards reducing polluting
emissions. Like Haibara (2002), we ﬁnd that technical assistance is superior to ﬁnancial aid in
addressing pollution problems. However, our model is diﬀerent in many signiﬁcant respects.
First and foremost, we explicity model the channel by which technical assistance aﬀects abate-
ment activities and we assume that technical assistance has a positive economic cost in the
donor country. Moreover, we add in transboundary pollution, which provides a direct motive
for aid. Although foreign environmental assistance is often characterized by a mix of altruistic
and self-interested considerations of the donor country, the latter type are better supported
by actual donor behaviour (e.g. Hassler, 2002).6 This cross-border externality creates an
additional link between the two jurisdictions beside international trade, and - as we argue
further below - it allows for a Pareto optimal outcome in a more natural scenario in which the
recipient, rather than the donor, is the net exporter of the dirty good in equilibrium.7 The
paper also diﬀers from Chao and Yu (1999) and Haibara (2002) in two other ways. First, it
allows marginal propensities to consume the polluting good to vary across the donor and the
recipient countries, which is consistent with existing empirical evidence.8 Second, it considers
the role of a border tax adjustment (BTA) as a policy instrument complementary to the green
technology transfer. While the early papers on BTAs such as Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973)
and Grossman (1980) look at the trade distorting eﬀects and implications of diﬀerent tax
6 As an illustration, Hassler (2002) cites the case of the Swedish self-interested environmental assistance
granted to other Baltic states such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Declaratively aimed at addressing general
environmental issues of high importance for those countries, the Swedish green aid was disproportionately
geared towards transboundary problems such as wastewater treatment, reduction of emissions from point
sources and nuclear safety.
7 It is widely accepted that OECD countries as a whole are net importers of embodied CO2 emissions,
while developing countries as a whole are net exporters (Peters and Hertwich, 2008) .
8 Naito (2003) cites empirical evidence showing above-unity levels of the income elasticity of demand for
energy, which translate into higher expenditure shares on polluting goods in countries with higher average
incomes. See p. 162.
6rates, there is also a growing sub-literature on BTAs in the context of environmental regu-
latory diﬀerences, spawned by papers such as Barthold (1994) and Poterba and Rotemberg
(1995). Recent contributions include Fischer and Fox (2009) and Dissou and Eyland (2009),
which explore the eﬀectiveness and the partial and general equilibrium eﬀects of border tax
adjustments, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section
four looks at the environmental and welfare eﬀects of the green technology transfer. Section
ﬁve analyzes the merits of a border tax adjustment as a complementary policy instrument
available to the donor, while section six summarizes and concludes.
3. The Model and Some Preliminaries
Suppose there are two countries, the donor and the recipient, producing a polluting good
x and a non-polluting numeraire y. The recipient country exports the polluting good x and
imports good y. The production processes of x and y as well as the clean-up activities use
several factors of production. We denote by v the factor endowments, and by vp and vg the
potentially non-disjoint vectors of factors devoted to the production and pollution abatement
processes, respectively.9
Polluting ﬁrms abate their emissions privately until their marginal costs of abatement are
equal to a given emission tax t set by the government. We assume that the emission tax in the
donor country is stringent enough to give suﬃcient incentives for polluting ﬁrms to abate all
emissions. However, the emission tax is low in the recipient country and e amount of unabated
pollution emissions is generated there in equilibrium.10 Pollution is transboundary. Denote
by z = θ1e the amount of domestic emissions that aﬀect the recipient country and z∗ = θ2e
9 For comparability, much of our notation throughout follows closely that of Chao and Yu (1999).
10 The developing recipient sets its emission tax at a lower level than the developed donor since they
weigh the diﬀerent components of their welfare functions diﬀerently: while the donor has a higher marginal
willingness to pay for abatement than the recipient, the reverse is true for the marginal utility of income.
7the amount of emissions that crosses the border to aﬀect the donor country (θ1,θ2 > 0).
When θ1  = θ2 pollution is local, and when θ1 = θ2 we are dealing with global pollution as a
special case.
Since private abatement does not completely eliminate the environmental damage in the
recipient country, a public agency also carries out some clean-up activities. We denote by
g the amount of public pollution abatement, where g ≤ e.11 Given this g amount of pollu-
tion abatement, the residual levels of pollution aﬀecting the recipient country and the donor





, where w(p,t) is a vector of factor returns and A is the total cost of foreign
assistance. The vector of factor returns, w(p,t), is a function of the price of the polluting
good (p) and the emission tax (t). The amount of foreign technology transfer A lowers the
marginal cost of public clean-up in the recipient country, i.e. c
g
A < 0. The total factor demand
of public pollution abatement vg is equal to gcg
w, while the total cost of public clean-up is gcg.







= t(θ1e + αθ2e) = tz
′ , (1)
where α (0 ≤ α < 1) is the fraction of transboundary pollution aﬀecting the donor country
which is internalized by the recipient of aid and p is the relative price of the dirty good x.
As emphasized by Brett and Keen (2000) as well as Schweinberger and Woodland (2008),
the assumption of earmarking pollution tax revenues for abatement purposes is supported
by substantial empirical evidence. Therefore, z′ represents the total amount of pollution
internalized due to the presence of the emission tax. When α = 0, the recipient country does
not internalize any of its emissions aﬀecting the donor country. Totally diﬀerentiating (1)
11 For model simplicity, public abatement is not an explicit option here for the donor. First, the donor
is already internalizing all self-produced pollution. Secondly, public clean-up of transboundary pollution is









This equation suggests that the change in public environmental clean-up depends on the
changes in tax revenues and goods prices, as well as on the eﬀectiveness of foreign assistance
at reducing the cost of abatement.
The recipient country’s budget constraint calls for total expenditures E on private goods
x and y to be equal to the sum of revenues from production R and tax revenues:
E (p,z − θ1g,u) = R(p,t,g) + tz
′, (3)
where E (p,z − θ1g,u) = min{dy + pdx : u = φ(dx,dy) + ψ (z − θ1g)} and R(p,t,g) =
= max{y + px − tz′ : (y,x,z′) ∈ T (vp)}, are the expenditure and revenue functions for the
recipient economy, respectively. dx and dy denote the demand for goods x and y, respectively,
T(vp) is the production technology for the private goods and u is the consumers’ utility. We
assume that the latter is additively separable in goods and pollution, and that pollution is
harmful (ψz < 0). Notice that the transfer has no direct impact on revenues in the recipient.
Totally diﬀerentiating (3) yields the change in the recipient country’s welfare:
Eudu = −Mdp − Ezdz + tdz
′ + (θ1Ez − c
g)dg , (4)
where M = dx − x < 0 is the recipient country’s export of good x to the donor, Eu = 1 by
choice of units and Ez is the marginal willingness to pay for a unit reduction in pollution in
the recipient. Equation (4) indicates that foreign aid aﬀects social welfare in the recipient
country through the terms-of-trade eﬀect as well as its eﬀects on the levels of local pollution,
pollution that is internalized, and environmental clean-up.





∗ (p) − γA , (5)
where γ corresponds to the marginal cost of the environmental technology transfer for the
9donor (0 < γ)12 and “∗” denotes the same variables as previously but for the donor country.
Since there is no (unabated) pollution generated in the donor country, the revenue function
R∗ (p) depends only on the commodity price p. One can determine the change in the donor










where M = x∗ − d∗
x < 0 is the donor’s import of good x from the recipient, and we set
E∗
u = 1 by choice of units. Equation (6) shows that the change in the donor country’s welfare
depends on the direct eﬀect of the transfer on income, on the terms-of-trade eﬀect, as well as
on the change in pollution level and in environmental clean-up in the recipient country, since
pollution in the recipient country is transboundary.
The world goods market clearing requires that the recipient country’s export of good x be
equal to its counterpart’s import of the same good:




∗) = Rp (p,t,g) + R
∗
p (p) . (7)
Indeed, from the above revenues and expenditures functions we obtain the demand of x as
Ep = dx (E∗
p = d∗
x) and the supply of x as Rp = x (R∗
p = x∗). Totally diﬀerentiating (7)
yields:
Sppdp = Rpgdg − Epudu − E
∗
pu∗du
∗ − Epzd(z − θ1g) − E
∗
pz∗d(z
∗ − θ2g), (8)
where Spp = Epp + E∗
pp − Rpp − R∗





























































> 0. It is worth mentioning that ∂x
∂g < 0 follows from the
12 We leave γ unrestricted from above here, since plausible scenarios can be imagined for both γ ≤ 1 (e.g.
the cost to the donor may be less than the beneﬁt for the recipient, for instance when the development of
the cleaner technology has positive spillovers) and γ > 1 (e.g. as opportunity cost when superior competing
purchase oﬀers exist for the technology, for instance from third countries where the marginal beneﬁt exceeds
the one in the recipient).








implies that an increase in the level of pollution leads to an
increase in demand for commodity x in order to compensate for the lost utility.13
Using Sheppard’s lemma we can write the level of the internalized pollution z′, as well as
the pollution levels in the recipient and donor countries z and z∗, as follows:
z
′ = θ1e + αθ2e = −Rt (9)









As assumed above, the recipient country internalizes only a fraction α of the transboundary
pollution, as opposed to the full amount aﬀecting its own residents.
The changes in these pollution levels correspond to:
dz









(Rtpdp + Rtgdg) , (14)










t capture the responses of the
level of pollution in the recipient country to an increase in the price of x and the amount of
public abatement eﬀorts, respectively. It is straightforward to see that Rtp < 0 whenever x is
a normal good (a higher price of x increases its output), and Rtg > 0 if factor intensities of
dirty good production x and public abatement g are such that they compete for some of the
same resources.14
13 The indiﬀerence curves between a good x and the bad z have a positive slope. See Copeland (1994) and
Chao and Yu (1999).
14 Rtg < 0 if the production of x and public abatement eﬀorts g do not compete for resources at all. We
consider the ﬁrst scenario (i.e. Rtg > 0) to be more plausible, which is also consistent with Chao and Yu
(1999).
11With the equations (2), (4), (6), (8), (12), (13), and (14), we form a system of seven
equations in seven unknowns: g, u, u∗, p, z′, z and z∗. The system contains two policy
instruments: one for the donor country, i.e. the amount of tied foreign aid, and the other for
the recipient country, i.e. the level of the emission tax. The following section uses this system
to analyze the welfare eﬀects of green foreign aid in the recipient and donor countries.
4. The Eﬀects of Green Technology Transfers
Like all foreign aid, green technical assistance has both a direct eﬀect on consumption
decisions and an indirect eﬀect via changes in the goods prices.The papers obtaining the ‘aid
paradox’ of donor enrichment and recipient immiserization generally assume that the donor
is experiencing a terms of trade (ToT) gain that outweighs the direct negative welfare eﬀect
of the transfer. In the aid for pollution abatement case ` a la Chao and Yu (1999) what is
then needed is the somewhat particular assumption that the donor exports the dirty good in
equilibrium. With transboundary pollution this is no longer a requirement: the donor country
may be importing the dirty good from the recipient of aid and may still gain due to strong
environmental beneﬁts. In view of the evidence suggesting that the manufacturing center of
gravity is shifting to the global South, we regard this as the more likely scenario.
Let us ﬁrst examine the terms-of-trade eﬀect of tied aid. This eﬀect can be found by








































[pRpg + (cg + tRtg)mx]
G
, (15)
where mx = pEpu (m∗
x = pE∗
pu∗) represents the marginal propensity to consume good x







z∗ ) corresponds to the degree of
15 Actually mx =
pEpu
Eu , but Eu is normalized to one.
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with G > 0 according to the stability conditions detailed in Appendix A.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (15) corresponds to the indirect price eﬀects of aid,
via the ensuing increase in the quality of the environment and savings on abatement. As the
green technology transfer generates savings in terms of abatement expenses in the recipient,
the demand for good x increases according to mx. At the same time, since the environment
quality improves, the demand for x decreases in accordance to mz. This combined eﬀect
exerts an upward pressure on the price whenever mx > mz, which follows from the stability
conditions. The second and the third terms correspond to similar eﬀects on the relative price
of x, this time from the donor’s side. Lower disposable income and a better environmental
quality in the donor tend to decrease demand for good x directly and indirectly, as required to
compensate for pollution according to m∗
z. This exerts a negative impact on the price. The last
term represents another indirect price eﬀect of aid and the general equilibrium impact exerted
on the prices of goods by the increased clean-up eﬀorts, via factor prices. The increase in
abatement eﬀorts, following foreign aid, partially crowds out the production of good x, which
leads to an increase in the equilibrium price of x. Also, the demand for x depends on the
clean-up cost cg and the impact of clean-up on total collected emission tax revenues.
Therefore we can state the following intermediary result:






is relatively small and/or c
g
A is high in absolute value (the technology is eﬀective enough).
When m∗
x is relatively large and/or c
g






13The intuition is based on the following demand and supply considerations. While the
cost of the transfer tends to depress the donor share of world demand for x without directly
increasing the recipient-based share, a relatively low marginal propensity to consume the pol-
luting good in the donor dampens this eﬀect. An eﬀective technology makes public abatement
of pollution more eﬀective than x production in using the shared factors, and thus ‘crowds-
out’ the latter. These demand and supply eﬀects combined produce a positive terms of trade
outcome. The intuition is the same only reversed for the second part of the lemma.
Chao and Yu (1999) assume identical marginal propensities to consume in the two countries
in order to obtain a positive terms of trade eﬀect for the dirty good exporter donor. Naito
(2003) shows that even untied environmental aid can generate a Pareto optimal outcome in
the more empirically plausible case when the marginal propensity to consume the dirty good is
larger in the donor, such that the terms of trade eﬀect again favors the donor. We follow Naito
(2003) in allowing for diﬀerent marginal propensities to consume good x in the two countries.
In addition, as mentioned above, we also allow for the recipient to be the equilibrium net
exporter of the dirty good. Therefore, depending on the parameters, both an increase or
a decrease in the price of good x are possible as a result of the green technology transfer.
What is new here is that the donor may gain in welfare terms (and a Pareto-improvement is
possible) with or without a terms of trade gain, as we argue further below.
Next we look at the eﬀect of the transfer on public pollution abatement. From equations
















dA < 0, then
dg




dA could be negative at ﬁrst sight. This
could potentially be the case as the increase in the price of x, following the increase in the
level of foreign aid, gives rise to a signiﬁcant increase in the economic cost of environmental
clean-up relative to the production of the dirty good. Interestingly however, we ﬁnd that the
public abatement change in the recipient is always positive, even when the terms of trade
eﬀect is positive,
dp
dA > 0. This holds under the stability conditions detailed in Appendix A
14and whenever good x has a normal output response to price changes.16
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Proposition 1. Green technological transfer always induces more public abatement in the
recipient, when the recipient is the exporter of the dirty good (M < 0), the marginal propensity
to consume x is weakly larger in the donor than in the recipient (m∗
x ≥ mx) and the market
for x is Walras-stable.
This result also holds when the donor exports x in equilibrium and the recipient has a
larger marginal propensity to consume the polluting good, although for reasons explained
above this is not our preferred scenario. It is worth emphasizing here that green technology
transfer appears more likely to be eﬀective in increasing pollution abatement in the recipient
than conditional monetary transfers.17
The above proposition indicates that there will be more public abatement of pollution after
the donation. Does this mean there will be a cleaner environment overall? Not necessarily.
While more abatement is undertaken, there may also be more production of x as a result of a
potentially positive terms of trade eﬀect, and thus more pollution. We now move to analyze
the eﬀect of the green technology transfer on pollution levels in the two countries. From (13)
































17 Chao and Yu (1999), for instance, require identical marginal propensities to consume good x in the two
countries in order to obtain this result.
15Using the result in Proposition 1, there will be less pollution overall when the transfer
induces a lowering of the international price of x: dz
dA < 0 and dz∗
dA < 0 if
dp
dA < 0. In such a
case there is both less production of x and more cleanup. However, even when the price eﬀect
is positive, there will be less pollution when the clean-up eﬀect is strong enough. But we can
also have dz
dA > 0 and dz∗
dA > 0 when
dp









dA, i.e. when the clean-up eﬀect
is relatively small compared to the terms of trade (ToT) eﬀect.
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The sign of dz
dA is ambiguous in general. It depends on a positive ﬁrst component (again
assuming
dp
dA > 0) which represents the pollution increasing eﬀect of higher prices via more
production, and a negative second component corresponding to the clean-up eﬀect on pollu-
tion. Signing expression (17) relies on the stability conditions and on the assumption that x
is a normal good.
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The sign of dz∗
dA is also ambiguous when
dp
dA > 0, depending again on a positive price eﬀect
of pollution component and a negative component corresponding to the clean-up eﬀect on
pollution.
16Proposition 2. The green technology transfer reduces the equilibrium level of pollution in
both the recipient and the donor countries when the clean-up eﬀect dominates any positive
price eﬀect. If the transfer has a negative terms of trade eﬀect, the eﬀect of the transfer on
pollution is unambiguously negative.
Let us now turn to the global welfare eﬀects of the green technology transfer. Adding
equations (4) and (6) yields the following:
du + du∗
dA
= (t − Ez)
dz
dA












If total environmental gains (in both countries) exceed total economic cost of clean-up ac-
tivities in the recipient country and the direct economic cost of the transfer to the donor,
then tied foreign aid tends to improve global welfare. More speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcients of
the pollution change terms in (19) are negative, since the environmental policy regime in the
recipient is less than eﬃcient by assumption (recall that t < Ez and αt < E∗
z∗ ), while the
coeﬃcient of the clean-up spending change is positive whenever abatement is socially desir-
able, or an appropriately weighted average of the marginal willingness to pay for pollution
reduction in the two countries exceeds the marginal cost of abatement: θ1Ez+θ2E∗
z∗ > cg. We
then substitute (16), (17), (18) in the above equation and after some further manipulation,
we obtain the explicit expression for the change in global welfare after the green transfer,
which can be found in Appendix C. This explicit expression is too complicated to yield any
further economic intuition. Still, we can conclude from (19) that as long as the conditions in
Proposition 2 hold, or parameters are such that the clean-up eﬀect is larger than the price
eﬀect, the green technology transfer leads to an improvement in the combined welfare of the
two countries.









+ (t − Ez)
dz
dA





When there is an increase in the price of the polluting good (
dp
dA > 0), the recipient’s welfare
increases if the environmental eﬀect and the ToT eﬀect of foreign aid are strong enough
17to compensate for the net economic cost of environmental clean-up. Even when
dp
dA < 0,
the recipient’s welfare may still increase if the environmental eﬀect of foreign aid is strong
enough to compensate for the economic cost of environmental clean-up and the recipient’s
terms of trade loss. On one hand, as one would expect, when there is a relatively eﬃcient
pollution taxation regime such that the tax rate is close to the marginal damage of pollution
(t ≈ Ez), the welfare eﬀect of pollution changes in the recipient is negligible. Likewise, the
pollution changes in the donor do not aﬀect recipient’s welfare when the tax rate is small
and/or the coeﬃcient of internalization of cross-boundary pollution (α) is small. This second
eﬀect provides justiﬁcation for the following section of the paper, in which green technology
transfer is complemented with a border tax adjustment that aims to target the transboundary
externality more directly. On the other hand, when the recipient country does not signiﬁcantly
internalize the domestic pollution externality (such that t ≪ Ez), any changes in pollution
following such targeted foreign aid have substantial welfare eﬀects in the recipient.
Similarly, the change in welfare in the donor is:
du∗
dA
















dA > 0, the donor’s welfare increases if the environmental eﬀect of foreign aid is
strong enough to compensate for the donor’s monetary and terms of trade losses. When
dp
dA < 0, the donor’s welfare increases if its environmental and terms of trade gains are strong
enough to compensate for the monetary loss associated with the transfer. The analytical
solutions for the individual welfare eﬀects are provided in Appendix C. The welfare eﬀects
can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. When the recipient of the green technology transfer is the net exporter of the
polluting good: i. The recipient always gains in welfare terms when the environmental beneﬁt
is large enough to compensate for a potentially negative ToT eﬀect; ii. The donor country can
gain when the net environmental beneﬁt of the transfer exceeds the direct cost of the transfer
and the potential terms of trade loss.
18Comparing these results to the literature,18 we can obtain a Pareto-improvement eﬀect of
the green transfer both when the donor experiences a positive and an adverse terms of trade
eﬀect, in the latter case provided that the environmental beneﬁts are strong enough. Depend-
ing on the parameters, the ‘normal result’ of recipient enrichment and donor immiserization
and the ‘transfer paradox’ when the opposites hold, may also occur in our setting. The former
is possible, for instance when the increase in the price of x is relatively large compared to the
environmental beneﬁts experienced by the donor as a result of the transfer, while the latter
may obtain when the signs of these eﬀects are reversed.
In the setting described at the beginning, there are two levels of ineﬃciency that char-
acterize environmental policy in the recipient country. One is the failure to undertake an
eﬃcient level of public abatement of pollution aﬀecting domestic consumers, and the other
is the incomplete taxation of transboundary pollution. While the technology transfer lowers
the marginal cost of public abatement in the recipient country and thus is likely to induce
lower levels of unabated pollution that spills over borders to aﬀect the donor, there is still an
incomplete degree of internalization of the cross-border externality, measured by α < 1. We
now move to examine the eﬀects of the green transfer when combined with an appropriate
border tax adjustment that aims to tackle the transboundary externality more directly.
5. The Eﬀects of Green Technology Transfers Combined with a Border Tax Ad-
justment
Border tax adjustments (BTAs) are increasingly being put forth as a tool to address
diﬀerences in the stringency of environmental regulation. In the context of foreign assistance,
the case for BTAs is perhaps made even more convincing by the following observations.
First, BTAs can help to ensure that the recipient does not misuse the donation. Second,
in the presence of an eﬀective green technology transfer, the aﬀordability argument used by
developing countries to legitimize environmental protection inaction is less credible. Moreover,
18 E.g. Chao and Yu (1999) and Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri and Michael (2002).
19as argued above in discussing parameter α, the recipient of aid may chose to internalize little
or no part of the transboundary pollution aﬀecting the donor. In this section we assess the
merits of such BTAs in our context. Will a border tax targeting the incomplete internalization
of cross-border pollution, combined with the green technology transfer work?
In what follows, we introduce a border tax adjustment and repeat the exercises in the
previous section. The budget constraint in the recipient country can be written as follows:
E (p − τ,z − θ1g,u) = R(p − τ,t,g) + tz
′ (22)
where τ is the border tax adjustment.
Totally diﬀerentiating the above equation yields
Epd(p − τ) + Eudu + Ezd(z − θ1g) = Rpd(p − τ) + Rgdg + tdz
′ . (23)
This is equivalent to
Eudu = −Mdp − Ezdz + tdz
′ + (θ1Ez − c
g)dg + Mdτ, (24)
where M = Ep − Rp = dx − x < 0.





∗ (p) − γA − τM . (25)
where M = dx − x = x∗ − d∗









∗ − θ2g) = R
∗
pdp − γdA − τdM − Mdτ , (26)









z∗dg − τdM − Mdτ. (27)
The world market clearing condition is now:




∗) = Rp (p − τ,t,g) + R
∗
p (p) . (28)
20Totally diﬀerentiating (28) yields:
Sppdp = Rpgdg − Epudu − E
∗
pu∗du
∗ − Epzd(z − θ1g) − E
∗
pz∗d(z
∗ − θ2g) + Mpdτ, (29)
where Mp = Epp − Rpp < 0.
Substituting (2), (12), (13), (14), (24), and (27) in (29) yields:
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By using the comparative static approach, we can examine the terms of trade eﬀects of
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with H > 0 according to the stability conditions provided in Appendix B.
Compared to the case without a BTA, the numerator of
dp
dA does not change, while its de-
nominator has a new negative component in terms of τ. The above results can be summarized
in the following intermediary result:
21Lemma 2. The border tax adjustment has a positive ToT eﬀect (i.e.
dp
dτ > 0). Moreover, it











Intuitively, the revenue shifting induced by the border tax adjustment in conjunction with
the assumed larger marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor leads to
a higher equilibrium relative price. Looking now at the change in the public abatement of
pollution in the recipient:
dg
dA












It is straightforward to notice that a negative terms of trade eﬀect would lead to more public
abatement of pollution. Not only is technology transfer making g cheaper at the margin, but
the lower price decreases production of x and freeing more of the shared factors of production

































By comparing (32) with (16), we can show that the denominator of (32) is lower than that
of (16) and (32) has a new negative component on the numerator. Thus, technological transfer
can give rise to both more or less clean-up eﬀorts when used alone than when combined with
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leads to the following result.
Proposition 4. The presence of the BTA reduces the eﬀectiveness of the green technology
transfer at increasing public pollution abatement if m∗
x is relatively small and/or c
g
A is high in
22absolute value.19 The amount of public pollution abatement in the recipient country can even
decrease below its pre-transfer level if τ is suﬃciently high.


























x + [M (m
∗
x − mx) + pSpp]Rtg − m
∗
xτMpRtg}. (33)
Comparing (17) and (33), we can see that the latter has a new positive component on the
numerator. The denominator still has one new negative component. Then, when the transfer
used alone increases pollution in the recipient ( dz
dA > 0, i.e. the green technology transfer
is ineﬀective at reducing pollution), the introduction of the BTA makes the situation even
worse as it generates more pollution. When the transfer used alone decreases pollution in the
recipient ( dz










































































The introduction of the BTA decreases the eﬀectiveness of the green technology transfer
at reducing pollution in the recipient (i.e. dz
dA|BTA− dz






x ≃ 0, i.e.
m∗
x is relatively small and/or c
g
A is high in absolute value (i.e, when the technology transfer is
19 i.e, when the technology transfer is eﬀective enough at reducing abatement costs. Note that these
conditions match exactly those for
dp
dA > 0.
23eﬀective enough).20 Thus, whenever there is a positive terms of trade eﬀect of the transfer, the
border tax adjustment instrument leads to a worsening of the equilibrium level of pollution
in the recipient.
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Similar to the previous case where the technology transfer is the only instrument used
to mitigate transboundary pollution, the above expression has an ambiguous sign. It has
a lower denominator than (18), and its numerator has one new component which is always
positive. Just like for the recipient country, we can show that when the use of the transfer
alone increases pollution in the donor (
dz∗
dA > 0), the introduction of the BTA makes the
situation even worse (it gives rise to more pollution). In turn, when the use of the technology
transfer alone decreases pollution in the donor (dz∗
dA < 0), the introduction of the BTA can
either increase or decrease the eﬀectiveness of the technology transfer. The introduction of the
BTA decreases the eﬀectiveness of the green technology transfer at reducing pollution levels
in the donor (dz∗
dA|BTA − dz∗








x ≃ 0, i.e. m∗
x is relatively small
and/or c
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20Note again that these conditions match exactly those for
dp































Proposition 5. The border tax adjustment typically worsens the environmental outcome in
the two countries and can only serve an environmental purpose when the technology transfer
is itself ineﬀective at reducing the cost of public pollution abatement (i.e. c
g
A ≃ 0) or when
the marginal willingness to consume the polluting good in the donor m∗
x is signiﬁcantly high.




|BTA = (t − Ez)
dz
dA












From the analysis above, we know that when the technology transfer is eﬀective at reducing
the cost of public pollution abatement and/or when the marginal willingness to consume the
polluting good in the donor is signiﬁcantly low, the transfer-induced change in abatement
dg
dA





smaller in absolute value in (35) than in (19). Therefore, maintaining our assumptions that
the existing tax in the recipient is ineﬃcient (t < Ez and αt < E∗
z∗), abatement is socially
desirable (θ1Ez + θ2E∗
z∗ > cg), and when the transfer is eﬀective in curbing pollution ( dz
dA < 0
and dz∗
dA < 0), the global welfare is larger when technological transfer is used alone than when
it is combined with a border adjustment tariﬀ.22 This adds support to the often made claim
that BTAs induce signiﬁcant costs, related mostly to increase in protectionism.

















21 Recall that Eu = E∗
u∗ = 1 by choice of units.
22 Note that the reverse is true when the technology transfer is ineﬀective at reducing the cost of public
pollution abatement and/or when the marginal willingness to consume the polluting good in the donor is
signiﬁcantly large.
25As discussed above, for technology transfers eﬀective at reducing the cost of public pollution
abatement and/or signiﬁcantly low marginal willingness to consume the polluting good in the
donor,
dg
dA is always higher when the only instrument used is technological transfer than when
the latter is combined with a border tax adjustment. This is also the case for the absolute
values of dz
dA and dz∗
dA. Therefore, when technical transfer is eﬀective in reducing the level of
pollution (
dz
dA < 0 and
dz∗




dA are always smaller in (36) than in
(20), yielding a lower level of welfare in the recipient.23 The term in dz∗
dA is always smaller
than its counterpart without the BTA.24As far as
dp
dA is concerned, when
dp
dA > 0, the term
in
dp
dA is larger in (36) than in (20). Therefore, the border tax adjustment is likely to induce
lower welfare gains in the recipient country than the transfer alone when the former induces
a small increase in the ToT eﬀect.
Turning to the welfare change in the donor country, we obtain:
du∗
dA


















dA terms are always smaller in (37) than in (21) when the technol-
ogy transfer is eﬀective at reducing the cost of public pollution abatement and/or when the
marginal willingness to consume the polluting good in the donor is signiﬁcantly low. When
dp
dA > 0, the
dp
dA term can be smaller or larger in (37) than in (21). As shown above, the
absolute value of the change in p is larger but the coeﬃcient of
dp
dA is smaller in absolute
value (M < M − τMp). This suggests that a border tax can help the donor oﬀset partially
the negative impact of the ToT eﬀect on its welfare. However, this occurs at the price of a
decrease in the environmental beneﬁts of the transfer. Moreover, recall that in this case we
23This holds under our assumptions that the tax rate is lower than the marginal willingness to pay for
pollution reduction (t < Ez) and abatement is socially desirable in the recipient country (θ1Ez > cg).
24 As shown above, the absolute magnitude of the change in donor pollution is lower as well, when the
technology transfer is eﬀective at reducing the cost of public pollution abatement and/or when the marginal
willingness to consume the polluting good in the donor is signiﬁcantly low.
26can have less public abatement (
dg
dA < 0), a result obtainable when there is a positive terms
of trade eﬀect (
dp
dA > 0). Under such circumstances, the donor is more likely to experience a
welfare deterioration as a result of the green transfer coupled with the border tax adjustment.
This may lead to the so-called ‘normal’ eﬀect of the transfer in which the recipient gains and
the donor loses, thus rendering the incentive-compatibility of the voluntary transfer program
problematic.
These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 6. From a global welfare perspective, green technology transfers and border tax
adjustments do not appear to be complements. The ‘carrot and stick’ approach - which uses
both a green transfer targeted at reducing the costs of public abatement and a border tax
adjustment- is dominated by the ‘carrot only’ approach -which uses the green transfer alone-
when the latter is eﬀective at dealing with the transboundary pollution problem. This holds for
both recipient and donor countries when the change in the ToT eﬀect following the introduction
of the border tax is minimal.
Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri and Michael (2002) also argue - without expanding too much on
the reasons - that rewarding (‘carrot-type’) rather than punitive (‘stick-type’) measures are
preferable. Here we show why this may be the case. Many argue that any green assistance
project should be accompanied by a mechanism designed to ensure that the recipient country
does not ‘misbehave’, for instance by treating cross-border pollution diﬀerently than domestic
pollution. This paper shows that - contrary to this intuition - while the ‘carrots’ are likely to
work and may even bring a Pareto-improvement, the use of sticks may backﬁre.
6. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of foreign assistance directed at
environmental goals. Pollution is generated as a byproduct in the manufacturing of a good.
There is both private and public abatement of pollution in the recipient country. However,
the system of environmental taxes is ineﬃcient there on two grounds. Firstly, the tax rate is
27lower than the marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement. Secondly, only a fraction
of cross-boundary pollution aﬀecting the neighbouring country/donor is taxed at even this
lower-than-optimal rate. To focus on the eﬀect of the transfer, we assume the donor perfectly
internalizes its own emissions. The model speciﬁes the tied aid as a green technological
transfer that lowers the marginal abatement cost in the recipient country, which is the actual
form taken by many foreign assistance programs focused on the environment.
Compared to the existing literature, the model allows for the more likely scenario that the
donor is the importer of the polluting good in equilibrium. Even in such conditions, the green
technology transfer can bring about a Pareto improvement, in which both the recipient and
the donor gain in welfare terms. The results depend on the relative strength of three eﬀects:
the terms of trade eﬀect, the environmental beneﬁt and the direct cost of the transfer. When
an additional instrument is used in the form of a border tax adjustment intended to correct
for the transboundary externality, the environmental and welfare eﬀects in both the recipient
and the donor are shown to deteriorate whenever the transfer is eﬀective.
The main results of this paper have interesting public policy ramiﬁcations. One of the key
messages to policymakers is that green technology transfers, even as they increase abatement
eﬀorts in the recipient, may ultimately lead to a rise in pollution levels in both the donor and
recipient countries when they boost the production of dirty goods. Whether or not BTAs can
be used as a complement to green technology transfers to reduce transboundary pollution is
another important policy question. This paper suggests that implementing BTAs - ‘the stick’
- carry signiﬁcant costs, even when combined with green technology transfers - which function
as a ‘carrot’. As a consequence, the ‘carrot-and-stick’ combination is less eﬃcient than the
‘carrot’ alone.
There exist several possible extensions of this paper, some of which we intend to explore
in future work. Firstly, an important feature the paper did not consider in its modelling
framework is that most of the recipients of green aid import from donor countries most
of the goods and services that are used for pollution abatement and the conservation of
28the environment. This brings in the possibility that tied green aid, and green technology
transfer in particular, may be desirable from the point of view of the donor country because
it generates more revenues for its environmental goods and services industry. Secondly, this
paper considers exogenous policy instruments (the emission tax in the recipient and the levels
of technology transfer and BTA in the donor) for simplifying the analysis. However, by
endogenizing these policy instruments, the political economy of the interaction between green
technology transfers and BTAs could give rise to diﬀerent welfare and environmental eﬀects
than those identiﬁed in this paper. Moreover, further research is needed concerning the more
detailed diﬀerences between the various types of tied green aid. In particular, environmental
assistance is often classiﬁed as either ‘green’ if destined for global or regional environmental
issues such as climate change or biodiversity preservation, or ‘brown’ if earmarked for local
environmental issues such as water and sanitation (Hicks et al., 2008). Since these two types
of aid are characterized by diﬀerent incentives from the donor point of view, it seems plausible
that the welfare and environmental impacts could diﬀer from one type to the other.
29Appendix
A. Stability conditions - Green Technology Transfer
Walrasian stability implies that the slope of the global excess demand is negative, or:
d
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[pRpg + mx (cg + tRtg)] < 0 (A-5)
We can show that
d
 
Ep (p,z − θ1g,u) + E∗




= G   gc
g
A < 0,
which implies that G > 0. Therefore, suﬃcient conditions for stability require: (i) mz <
mx (m∗
z < m∗
x); (ii) mx < m∗
x; (iii) Rpg < 0; (iv) tRtp +gcg
p > 0; (v) pRpg +mx (cg + tRtg) < 0;
(vi) pSpp − tmxRtp < 0 or mx is relatively small.
B. Stability conditions - Green Technology Transfer combined with a Border-
Tariﬀ Adjustment
Walrasian stability requires that the following inequality is veriﬁed
d
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32which is equivalent to






































where Mp = Epp − Rpp < 0.
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We can show that
d
 
Ep (p,z − θ1g,u) + E∗




= H   gc
g
A < 0,
which implies that H > 0. Therefore, suﬃcient conditions for stability require: (i) mz <
mx (m∗
z < m∗
x); (ii) mx 6 m∗
x; (iii) Rpg < 0; (iv) tRtp+gcg
p > 0; (v) pRpg+mx (cg + tRtg) < 0;
(vi) pSpp − (tRtp + M)mx < 0 or a relatively small mx; (vii) M < τMp or
τMp
M > 1.25





M < 0. Therefore, the last condition requires that the elasticity of export
supply with respect to the BTA is higher than 1 in absolute value.
34C. Further derivations - pollution and welfare eﬀects
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which can be further simpliﬁed to yield equation (17) in the text. The expression for the
change in pollution in the donor is similar.
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which can be written as in equation (33) in the text.
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This can be re-written as in equation (34) in the text.
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